G.R. No. 212687 (Resolution) – SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, and REVENUE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue Region No. 12, Bacolod City, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO D. MUÑEZ, in his capacity as Executive Judge of Branch 60, Regional Trial Court in Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, RURAL SUGAR PLANTERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC., NORTHERN NEGROS PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., CONFEDERATION OF SUGAR PRODUCERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., UNITED SUGAR PRODUCERS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR PRODUCERS (NFSP), INC. and ANTONIO G. TAMON, respondents.

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.

Rule Synopsis

A moot and academic case ceases to present a justiciable controversy or conflicting issue by virtue of supervening events. A declaration thereon would be of no practical value. Courts will not issue advisory opinions or resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.

Facts

In 2013, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued Revenue Regulation (RR) No. 13-2013, changing the definition of “raw sugar” to include only muscovado, thereby subjecting other types of sugar to Value-Added Tax (VAT). Several sugar planter groups challenged this, arguing that the new rule was unconstitutional and harmful to their industry. They claimed the BIR violated due process, and the regulation conflicted with existing tax laws.

The trial court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and later a preliminary injunction stopping the implementation of RR 13-2013, saying that enforcing the regulation could cause serious harm before the case was fully resolved. The government, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued this injunction was illegal due to the “no injunction” rule on tax collection under the Tax Code, and that the trial court had overstepped its jurisdiction.

Later, in 2015, the Department of Finance replaced the controversial rule with RR 8-2015, redefining raw sugar again and restoring its VAT-exempt status. However, the government insisted the main issue remains: whether courts can block tax regulations like this one through injunctions. Thus, the OSG filed a petition before the Supreme Court seeking to declare as improper the trial court’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction for violating the “no injunction rule.”

Issues

Should the OSG’s petition be granted?

Ruling and Discussion

No. OSG’s petition should not be dismissed on the ground of mootness.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy or when the conflicting issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.

Here, RR 8-2015 restored the VAT-exempt status of raw sugar previously withdrawn under the subject RR 13-2013. This development is a supervening event which renders the main action for declaratory relief against the constitutionality of the old RR 13-2013 academic. Petitioners do not refute this. Where the main action has become academic, so have the ancillary relief for TRO or writ of injunction and all related incidents, including petitioners’ opposition to its issuance and the present petition seeking to nullify the writ of injunction issued by the trial court.

Moreover, insisting on a resolution of how the “no injunction rule” was supposedly violated when the trial court issued the assailed writ of injunction is actually asking the Court to render an advisory opinion, resolve a hypothetical or feigned problem, or a mere academic answer, which is beyond the Court’s power of review.

dispositive

Petition dismissed.